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RETHINKING "POLITICAL" CONSIDERATIONS IN INVESTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS BY PROFESSOR DAVID H.
WEBBER, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
2016 VISITING SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE IN CORPORATE AND
BUSINESS LAW ATDELAWARE LAW
Delivered to Delaware Judiciary and Bar The Wilmington Club,
Wilmington, Delaware

September 12, 2016
Five years ago, Professor David H. Webber was invited to deliver an
address both to our DelawareLaw School community and to the Delaware
Bench andBaras Visiting Scholarin Residence ofCorporateandBusiness
Law. Webber's Speech, "Rethinking 'Political' Considerations in
Investment," made several predictions about the rise of politicized
investment which were quite prescient. As relevant today as when it was
delivered, this piece explores the consideration of investment factors
outside the traditionalrealm of shareholderprofit maximization, both in
its current state and in the future. Webber's analysis of how investors
balance the role ofcapitalaccumulation with the special concerns of their
members is addressed with objectivity and attentiveness. As "political"
factors are on the rise in what seems every facet of our nationallandscape,
it is increasinglyimportantto addresshow suchforces can impact markets
and economies. On the occasion of its fifth anniversary, the Delaware
Journalof CorporateLaw has decided to publish the speech so it can be
read by a broadersegment of the corporatelaw community.
- Dante S. Pavan, Editor-in-Chief
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[00:00:15]
INTRODUCTION: So we'll get underway. Welcome everybody. Thanks
for being here. It's agreat pleasure to introduce our speaker. But a couple
things to point out before we get to that. First of all, I want to thank former
Chief Justice Myron Steele, who is our sponsor here at the Wilmington
Club. And appreciate your hospitality very much. Good to have you here,
too. I'm hoping to find some good questions to ask.
Also, want to thank Ellisa Habbart and Delaware Counsel Group for yet
another year of sponsorship of this event, which I was trying to impress
upon our guest, has been extraordinarily successful. We are very proud of
the record of identifying up-and-coming young scholars, and watching
them give their talks here, and then go on to great things in academia, and
continue to influence the development of Delaware law and Delaware
corporate and business law, in particular. So I have enjoyed this program.
I've enjoyed thinking about whom to invite, and appreciate Ellisa's counsel
in that, and sure we'll do very well again. One more administrative
announcement. After the program, you are welcome to a reception
downstairs. I encourage you to stay. If you've got to leave, I understand.
But chance to hang around and speak to our guest,who I'll introduce now.

[00:01:47]
David Webber, I found out this afternoon, is not a stranger to Wilmington.
I'm told that he was a young associate at Patterson [00:01:58] I guess, and
had the pleasure of being a participant in a bitterly contested two-week
trial in front of then-Vice Chancellor Strine, not that that could ever be
stressful. But so he's been to Wilmington before, and knows the drill.
Which is not surprising,because he came to my attention as someone who
had authored some very interesting works on the dynamics of shareholder
litigation. And he's written on that subject, written about and taught about
shareholder activism, a lot of the subjects that we hold near and dear. That
is not, strictly speaking, his topic for today. And I'll let him introduce that
topic.

[00:02:40]
But before I sit down, I wanted to give him a token of our appreciation,
which I pulled from yesterday mornings' Wilmington New Journal, if you
didn't see it. David, it's got your picture here. And a little article about your
background. So by all means enjoy it. Show it to your family. Tell them
that you really were here. [laughter] Okay. And with that, I'll step down
and invite Ellisa Habbart to-
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ELLISA HABBART: Oh, there's nothing formal to say, only that I really
appreciate the continued support of the Bar, and that Larry and I, not soon
after this is done, we start thinking about the next scholar. So if you have
come across any writings or persons that you think would be good for our
annual event, please direct that information to us for our review.
INTRODUCTION: But without further adieu,
University Law School, David Webber.

live from Boston

[applause]

[00:03:42]
DAVID WEBBER: Thank you very much. I think I'll leave the article on
the chair where it's safer from this bottle of water. But thank you. Thank
you very, very much for inviting me. Larry, I want to thank you for inviting
me, Ellisa, thank you as well. And thanks also to Carol and Flora for
helping me get here. It's really an honor to be the Visiting Scholar in
Residence in Corporate and Business Law here, to be invited to address
this most distinguished Corporate Bar and Judiciary. And also, to follow
in the footsteps of many of the scholars that Larry just referenced, all
terrific people who I've gotten to know well in the academic circuit over
the last few years. And with a definite penchant towards caring about
doctrine and litigation and very real world corporate law issues, which I
certainly appreciate and strive to emulate whenever I can.

[00:04:40]
It's true, I've written a lot about shareholder litigation and shareholder
activism, including a couple of articles, empirical papers, and institutional
investor lead plaintiffs in Delaware M&A class actions. And I recently had
a paper on plaintiff law firms in Delaware, with co-author Adam Badawi
of Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. So, in addition to
my having been a bag carrier on the trial here in front of then-ViceChancellor Strine, my focus has been on Delaware.
But I am pulling back the focus quite a bit, for purposes of the talk today.
And I'm taking this as an opportunity to think through some of the bigger
issues that I've been thinking about lately. In some ways, I've been making
a conscious effort to try to step back and think through. You know, what
are some of-Now, as I look out on being a scholar, and the scholarly space
that I'll occupyfor the next 20-30 years, hopefully, you know, what seem
like the big important trends going on now, that are likely to show up and
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manifest again and again? And what are the big, important developments
going on right now?

[00:05:58]
And there are, of course, any number that one could choose. But the one I
wanted to talk abouttoday was the question of what are called, or what I
would call political considerations in investment, right. And so having
chatted about this a bit with some of my non-corporate law colleagues on
the faculty at Boston University School of Law, you quickly develop an
appreciation for just how hot-button and intense even the word "political"
can be, and the many different things that it can mean. And what gets
called political versus something else is itself a controversial subject to
debate. So I'm going to cut that off right at the beginning, because I don't
want to spend a lot of time debating what "political" is, and basically work
back from a traditional kind of corporate law finance definition of it, and
then work forward from there.
So the way I define what political investment considerations are, is they're
almost any investment considerations that depart from classic investment
calculations. So if you go back to finance 101, or you go back to a certain
view of corporate law, right, what does a reasonable investor do? What
does a rational investor do? Well, in making investment decisions, they try
to figure out what the net present value of future cash flows is, discounted
by their risk characteristics of the investment. And that's more or less how
you go about making an investment, right. It's a rational calculation. The
purpose of it is straightforward, to maximize returns to the portfolio, at
least to do so consistent with whatever your particular risk profile may be.
And then, of course, the great complexity, of course, comes in into, "Well,
how do you do that? How do you do it well?" And much of finance, as an
academic enterprise, is devoted that question.

[00:07:48]
So for purposes of this talk, then, what I mean by politicize is sort of
anything that departs from that basic investment focus, you know, on
maximizing returns, maybe consistent with a diversified portfolio,
depending on what the goals are, right. Any other rational reason why you
might make one investment over another. Now, what I'm also not talking
about is, you know, people who make investment decisions on the basis
of what their astrologer tells them to do, or sort of everything that we
would all agree would be a rational investment decision-making. Well, I
assume. I'm making some assumptions here. Forgive me if I've ridden
roughshod over one of your preferences. But I'm assuming that there aren't
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a lot of people consulting astrological charts and making investments, at
least not in this room.

[00:08:34]
And so what I talk about, then, is that kind of, you know, politicizedsomething else that comesinto the investment decision. And so I talk about
what I call multipreference shareholders, right. What's a multipreference
shareholder? Maybe in contrast to a unipreference shareholder.
Unipreference shareholder would basically be anybody who is really
interested in that classic definition of maximizing returns consistent with
whatever their risk profile is.
But if you look around the world to me, right now, particularly if you look
at the explosive growth of sovereign wealth funds, the continuing and
growing role, let's say, public pension funds and labor union funds are
playing in corporate governance fights and shareholder activism. And
some very interesting developments in the foundations. What we see is
some interesting movement, at least, on what exactly these entities take
into account when making investment decisions, arguably in ways that I
think are changing the investment landscape.

[00:09:38]
Of course, all of these entities-pension funds, sovereign wealth funds,
and foundations care about portfolio performance. If that portfolio
performance gets ignored, they go away and get smaller very, very
quickly, and whatever other objectives they may have, they can't pursue if
they aren't also tending to the portfolio. That having been said, if you look
at each of these entities-I'm not the first to observe this-If you look at
each of these entities, it's as if, in their DNA, if I could use that-in their
DNA, we can identify that they have multiple interests that are necessary
for them to act on and take consideration of, if they are going to sustain
themselves in their mission, if they're going to sustain themselves, and
even enhance their goals as an institution, right.

[00:10:28]
So, when it comes to sovereign wealth funds, of course, we have this
growing concern which was there from the beginning, and I think, in some
ways, has been ignored a little bit recently, about how they might
simultaneously pursue nationalist agendas. They might pursue the interest
of the sponsoring nation-state, you know, rather than just sort of classic
maximizing return behavior. Pension funds, this comes up all the time with
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public pension funds, that they have an interest in the jobs of their
members.
It came up, maybe most prominently, in recent years, in justifying the D.C.
Circuit's decision inbusiness roundtable versus the SEC, to strike down the
SEC's proxy access rule, for failing to adequately, in the court's judgment,
failing to adequately do cost benefit analysis on so-called special interest
shareholders, like public pension funds and labor union funds, that have
interestsin their members' jobs, okay, and how that might affect their

behavior as investors.
[00:11:26]
And foundations. You know,. foundations, of course, want to maximize
their portfolio. But they also have the agendas for which they were created,
that increasingly, they seem willing to pursue through the portfolio. And
so actually, so at the outset, then, sovereign wealth funds, for example,
have grown nine fold in terms of assets under management in the last 10
years. Pension funds have gotten more vocal. So have the foundations.
And so part of what's going on here is that, as more of the market becomes
invested into entities like these, we may expect to see pressures and shifts
on a variety of legal doctrines, which are going to have to increasingly deal
with these multiple preferences and how these shareholders go about
pursuing them.
So yes, they may have very good reasons to maximize the portfolio. But
there is two things that they might do, to pursue their other goals. One is,
that yes, they're just going to maximize the value of the portfolio, in
whatever way that they see best, most fit. But, alongside that, they're also
going to use that portfolio to pursue other goals. Even, so for example,
there is the investments of equal value rule, which has long been
propounded by the Department of Labor in interpreting the fiduciary duties
of pension trustees. Okay.

[00:12:55]
And it basically says, if you're choosing between two investments of equal
risk and profit potential, okay, as long as they're equal-huge asterisk next
to that one, right? - But as long as they're equal, you could select one or
the other for any reason under the sun, all right. You can choose between
investment managers for similar reasons, which gives some leeway to
bring in all sorts of other criteria in making investment decisions.
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And then, to make an argument that's a little bit more controversial
perhaps, arguably these institutions will be faced within moments when
they might consciously choose to make an investment decision that is
worse for the portfolio, because it advances some other interest. So that's
pretty abstract. And let me put some real world examples on the table, to
try to put some flesh on the bone here, all right.

[00:13:48]
So here is one example I wrote about a couple years ago, in an article

published in 2014, called "The Use and Abuse of Labor's Capital," which
was published in the NYU Law Review. And it really is about public
pension funds investing in privatizing investments, right. So there was a
very interesting article in the New York Times Magazine a couple weeks
ago about the role of private equity in privatizing all sorts of public
services, right, private prisons, private public school service companies,
private firefighting companies, private police companies, private bridges,
and private tunnels, and on and on and on, right. So many of these
functions that have classically been assigned to the public sector, are
increasingly being privatized.
Setting aside entirely the public policy debates about whether that's a good
thing, a bad thing, how we feel about it, etcetera, etcetera, a lot of that
work is being financed, actually, by public pension funds. If you lookThe latest figures I saw were something around 45 percent of all assets
under management by private equity funds come from public pension
funds, right. That's a very significant investment by public pension funds.

[00:14:56]
And so the example I w-ote about in this article a couple years ago was
reported by Bloomberg News. And here are the facts. A custodian's union
in Chelmsford, Massachusetts, which is in the same county where I live,
custodian's union has its pension fund invested through a public pension
fund in Aramark, a company called Aramark, okay, which was owned by
a private equity pool, okay.
So they make this investment in Aramark. Not long thereafter, Aramark
shows up in Chelmsford, underbids this custodian's union for the
Chelmsford Schools contract, and then offers those custodians their jobs
back. They had been making like $20-$25 dollars an hour. They get their
jobs offered back for $8-$8.50 an hour, okay, very, very steep pay cuts for
these workers.
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[00:15:40]
Now, again, I'm not addressing the broader issue about privatization one
way or the other. But, it does raise some very interesting questions about
fiduciary duties of pension trustees making such an investment, right.
What does it mean if you take the retirement funds of, say, security guards
who work in a public state prison, and invest it in the private prison, whose
profits, to some extent, are dependent upon that security guard working
for lower pay and lower benefits than right what the public security guard
was doing, okay?
Now, under a classic understanding of-maybe not classic-Under a
particular understanding ofthe fiduciary duty of loyalty to these pension
trustees, the only question was, well, what's the value of this investment?
And in fact, from what I understand, the investment did pretty well in
Aramark. So in this Bloomberg News article, there was a similar thing that
had happened in Louisiana, where post-Katrina, a lot of services were
contracted out to Aramark and financed by a Louisiana pension fund,
whose own workers had their jobs substantially cut back when the private
entity showed up in town, right.

[00:16:55]
And the Louisiana pension fund leader basically defended it and said,
"Look, we just look at the performance for the fund, the returns to the fund,
and that's the end of the analysis." And I sort of questioned that in this
article, right, in pointing out, you know, look. First of all, if you're a
pension trustee, right, even if you have a fund-first view; that is to say, all
your job is, is to focuson the performance of the fund. Even if that's your
whole view, right, when fewer people have those jobs and aren't
contributing into the fund, and when the employer-say the state or the
county, municipality, doesn't have to contribute as much because there
aren't as many workers in the fund, it may be the case that maximizing
investment performance, okay, is not actually what's most in the interest
of the fund.

[00:17:41]
And that's separated apart from a textualist argument about, is it really
about the fund? This gets into ERISA, but I'll quote it briefly. I mean
basically, what the standard said, is, you know, a trustee is supposed to
invest, "solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries, and for the
exclusive purpose of providing benefits." That's the language. "Solely in
the interests of participants and beneficiaries." And in 2008, the
Department of Labor issued an interpreted bulletin that said, "What that
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means is the fund," okay. What it means is, acting in the best interest of
the fund, which I actually personally did not agree with, from just a
question of sort of understanding the text, right. I mean if the language is
participants and beneficiaries, etcetera, etcetera.
But my larger point that I would draw from that is illustrating precisely
what I'm trying to talk about here, which is, right, these entities, we look
at sort of just-I'm not even talking about the personal preferences of
whoever is leading them. We all know that leaders are human. They have
their own political ideological charitable preferences. That goes in one
basket. I'm talking about advancing the interests of the institution, okay,
through the portfolio, is complicated, in that it isn't obvious, actually, that
maximizing returns is the best-is what most advances the interest. And
that raises some very interesting questions of implications about, I think,
the duty of loyalty in this context.

[00:19:07]
I want to throw out, because part of what I'm trying to do is persuade you
that this stuff is changing everywhere at the same time. I now want to
throw out an example from a totally different realm, and indeed, a different
part of the world, that I think advances my thesis about politicization,
which is a very interesting episode that happened recently with the Russian
Sovereign Wealth Fund and an investment Ukraine. I don't know if any of
you may have seen anything about this. But there was an article in The
Economist about it, and elsewhere.
So I'll tell it to you briefly, which is, in December 2013, the Russian
Sovereign Wealth Fund made a very substantial investment in Ukraine, $3
billion dollar investment, very interesting transaction. Ukraine issued one
bond. It issued this one bond through the Irish Stock Exchange, in a deal
brokered by law firms that everybody in this room knows very well. And
that one bond was earmarked to be sold to Russia-or excuse me, to the
Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, not the same thing, at least not in theory,
right, as Russia.

[00:20:21]
And, by the way, the interest rate, the return on investment was one-half
the going market rate for Ukrainian bonds at that time, right. So here you
have a situation. The Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund decides to make a
very large investment in Ukraine, a very unstable part of the world, for
half the going rate of return, okay. Already, it starts to look a little bit
suspicious. And if we insist on keeping our investment blinders on, and I
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think you know, there's many people out there who are very committed to
the idea that sovereign wealth funds are only just investors all the time.
That's the way to understand it, right, it's hard to understand the following,

right.
[00:20:59]
But what happens? What happens is, a couple months later, as many of us
know, the Ukrainian Premier flees, Russia invades, and there were some
very interesting provisions of this sovereign wealth fund transaction. One
was that the second that Ukraine's debt to GDP ratio exceeded 40 percent,
it was in default. And, in being in default, it's not only in default to Russia,
but all of Ukraine's debt, okay, automatically got triggered in this default.
What was the effect of this? The effect of this-and I know this is getting
far afield from how wenormally think about investment, the effect of it
was, that Russia was able to entirely block IMF aid to the country of
Ukraine. It had, under the IMF's own rules, okay. And this, I argue, had
nothing to do-this was not an investment at all, frankly, all right. This
was not about the Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund deciding, "Now would
be a great time to park $3 billion in Ukraine, okay, for less than half the
going market rate." The purpose of that investment was entirely something
else. It was to advance the political agenda of Russia at that particular point
in time, right.

[00:22:17]
Now there are plenty of other examples that I can go through. But this, to
me, is like another example, sort of increasing, sort of, politicization of
investments. The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund has been under
pressure from one of its main political parties, and there's been domestic
movements in Norway as well, to push for investments in Africa as a
matter of socialconscience. And this brings in a whole other realm of
discussion about socially responsible investing and all that goes along with
that.
And then finally, one other point I want to-one other data point to put out
there is about foundation shareholder activism. So there's one foundation
that I have spoken to a few times now, that has the typical model of, well,
they have their particular agenda, which involves environmental issues, it
involves net neutrality, and things of that nature. And typically, what do
they do? They do what most foundations do, which is every year give away
four percent to fund whatever their particular interests are, right.
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[00:23:16]
But they have recently, among others, come to the conclusion, like why
should we pursue our foundation agenda only through the four percent?
We also have 96 percent of the endowment that's invested out there. And
we can, through shareholder activism, continue to pursue our
environmental agenda and other agendas, right, by meeting with
companies and putting pressure and building alliances and engaging in
forums of shareholder activism, etcetera, etcetera.
Well these are all from entirely different parts of the world, parts of the
investment world, parts of the investment market. Foundations, sovereign
wealth funds, public pension funds, okay. But to me, there is a common
theme, which is that, in each of these instances, we can see institutions that
would appear to have incentive to depart, if not actually departing, from
classic portfolio maximizing investment activities, but making investment
decisions that advance some other aspect of that institution's interests.

[00:24:15]
Now what's interesting about this? I hope there's something interesting
about this. Otherwise, we can go to dinner early. But look. I think if we
look back-So first of all, I think-I started to say at the outset, do I think
this kind of activity is going to totally displace markets and investors as
we know it? Absolutely not. There's all sorts of countervailing pressures
there. There's also a lot of people out there, you know, hedge funds, most
mutual funds, individual investors, and others, who are you know, classic
traditional investment criteria aren't going anywhere.
However, I do think that, as more assets get shifted into institutions like
these, and never mind, even, the trillions of dollars that have committed,
at least on paper, to the UN Principles of Responsible Investment, etcetera.
There's reasons to be skeptical about, follow through on, etcetera. But
when you have, I think, shifts in investor profiles, it's not long before you
start to get-and we're past the point; we're already seeing it-all sorts of
legal tensions, doctrinal tensions, institutional tensions, that I think are
already coloring much of what we do, what the people in this room do, and
what I expect to be doing for the next couple of decades, right.

[00:25:36]
So some examples, right. In the 2 0th century, we saw a clear shift, a
different kind of shift, but not all radically different, from a market
comprised almost entirely of individual investors to amarket that, today, is
dominated by institution investors, right. So today, something like 70
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percent of the market is institutional investors, right. And individuals have
really retreated into this kind of minority role in the market. We've all seen
the tensions in this.
I mean I teach securities regulation. It's another area I've written in, right.
You talk about the 33 Act and the 34 Act, those had in mind, for the most
part, the protection of individual investors. Investor protection was the sort
of primary goal of those statutes, right, and remains an important goal
today. But, as institutionalization has grown, we've seen all sorts of shifts
in the legal doctrine, formally, informally, that have changed the securities
laws to accommodate those new realities.

[00:26:40]
I listed a couple here. You know, the existence of qualified institutional
buyers, right. These are,you know, once you get-once you're defined in
the securities laws as a qualified institutional buyer, you are exempted
from all sorts of the protections of the securities laws, right. You don't get
as much protection. It's interesting that that framing makes it sound like a
disadvantage. In many respects, it's an advantage. There are all sorts of
securities offerings you can participate in,that others can't. You get all sorts
of benefits in your ability to resell securities that other individuals and
other institutions don't get.
How about the preference for institutional lead plaintiffs in Delaware
shareholder litigation? Not to mention that at the federal level, right. We
have now a system in place that places some- There's less emphasis on
Delaware than - It's less cut-and-dry in Delaware than it is at the federal
level. But it's still there. Cases like TCW and Hertz[?] and others, right,
which developed this preference for institutional lead plaintiffs in
Delaware class actions. Why? They're more sophisticated. They tend to
have larger losses, which may give them more skin in the game, right. All

sorts of reasons why.
[00:28:00]
We look to the real world, and some changes to the institution, to the
investor portfolio, and the law adjusts accordingly. Another example,
what's happened to fiduciary duties, right? It used to be the prudent person
standard, right, was one standard that we had. We've since migrated over
to a prudent investor standard, which also has a way of accommodating
diversification in asset allocation, right, and an accommodation, too, to
institutional investors that are bouncing all sorts of interests, and making

investment decisions.
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[00:28:37]
So each of these are examples of how one particular shift in investor
profile has had all sorts of effects on legal rules, on statutes, on doctrine,
etcetera. And so I would argue that these kinds of pressures, whether they
be top-down political pressures on investment, like the example of the
Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, or even bottom-up ones, more populist
ones, like the Norwegian example, or socially responsible investing,
etcetera, that these pressures in the marketplaces are changing the way we
think about-And, by the way, it's not just that these institutions are
getting stronger, or are having more influence.
It's also that there's spillover effects. It affects the way everybody else sees
what they're investing for, why they're investing, right. I mean
increasing-You get these calls about boycotts, and counter-boycotts that
we hear about sometimes, right. I mean this is not-We haven't always
thought about investment in this way. It's true that investment has beenthere's always been political elements to investment. And it sort of rises
and it falls. But it seems, to me,that we are on an upswing again.

[00:29:57]
And I think that means that there are a number of areas that are ripe for
potential re-analyses, thatare ripe for potential tensions in the coming
years. And so I'll finish up by talking about a few ofthese areas that I think
are particularly susceptible to these pressures. One I've already touched
on, which is the meaning and the scope of the duty of loyalty. And in
particular, I'm actually talking about this less on the corporate side context
than on the investment side context.
You know, there is this-there's a real interesting mismatch that I think
hasn't mattered for muchof our history, but is mattering more and more,
between the fiduciary duties that govern, say, boards of directors and
corporate leaders, and the fiduciary duties that exist on the buy side, for
trustees and investment managers, right. One, the latter, really comes out
of a trust-the trust lawemployee benefits, ERISA, state pension codes
line. And, where most of us spend most of our time, is on the corporate
law line, which also comes out of trust law, but is developed along a
different pathway.

[00:31:07]
And the duty of loyalty, in the corporate context, doesn't mean the same
thing as the duty loyalty in the investment management context. The duty
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of loyalty in the corporate context, you know, self-dealing, we can deal
with that in the corporate context. In the trust side context, it's verboten,
right. There's no excusing it, right. It's you nullify it automatically.
So we have this situation, now, where you've got investors on the bottom.
And you've got a trustee up here with one set of fiduciary duties. And
you've got a corporate leadership on the investee side with a different set
of fiduciary duties. And there may be more and more tension between
them. And in fact, I would argue that probably the direction things need to
go, although maybe this just reflects my own bias as a corporate law
person, is it would seem to me that, over time, these employee benefits
funds and pension funds are going to need to be turning increasingly to
corporate law, to figure out how to navigate some of the conflicts and some
of the issues that they're dealing.

[00:32:13]
One simple example is sort of the business judgment rule, right. You have
the business judgmentrule for a corporation. But, having looked at this
stuff on the pension side, there really isn't a business judgment rule on the
pension side. Now there are some courts that sort of say, "Well, we kind
of sometimes have one, maybe, right." How much legal-How much
comfort has anybody gotten from that kind of analysis, right? Not very
much, that would give some leeway tocorporate leaders to make decisions,
that it's not quite clear as much on the trust side.
Let me give you one other quick example. And I know my time is running
out, which is you know, CalSTRS and other funds that divest-you know,
CalSTR is the California State TeachersRetirement System, divested from
gun companies after the Newtown, Connecticut massacre, right. They just,
"We don't want to own this stuff anymore." Now, from a certain narrow
investment perspective, and you know, I'm not a-I applaud what they did.
I'm not opposed to it,right, to that divestment. But it is interesting to
unpack it from sort of an investment analysis perspective. I mean
unfortunately, the cynical reality is that, very often, after an event like that,
there's a sharp uptick in gun sales, etcetera.

[00:33:26]
I mean if you're really just focusing on certain kinds of investment criteria,
CalSTRS has developed criteria-one of its risk factors is investing in
products that are a harm to public safetyand public health. What's the
investment rationale? The investment rationale is, well, these entities are
going to be regulated in the future. And they're going to face lawsuits. And
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they're going to face litigation. And so it's best to get out now. Okay,
that's-Okay, that's potentially a valid investment analysis. I'm not
directly going to argue with that one.
But, you know, many of us have a sense that this has also been long
understood that under trdst, the American Cancer Society doesn't have to
invest in tobacco, right, because it sort of cuts directly against the grain of
what the entity exists for, etcetera. Those are the kinds of issues, though,
that I think this increased politicization magnifies and teases out more. And
we're going to see more of that in the coming years, as issues like this
come to a head.

[00:34:27]
A final point would be about the definition of a reasonable investor for
materiality purposes andsecurities, right. We understand in the TSC case,
right, famous case defining materiality in the investment context, right, for
purposes, right, in the presence of a duty to disclose information, right,
what information does the corporation have to disclose, right? It's got to
disclose the material information, the information that would assume
actual significance in the mind of a reasonable investor, that would affect
the total mix of information, etcetera, etcetera.
Well, you know, as increasingly investors want all sorts of different kinds
of information, particularly pertaining to these other interests, potentially,
jobs interests, environmental interests, etcetera, etcetera, right, what does
that ultimately do to the reasonable investor standard in the face of
pressures like that?

[00:35:21]
Well, one possible reaction is, batten down the hatches. We are going to
continue to insist that, you know, investors fit a particular profile. And I'm
not saying that would be totally unprecedented. There are areas of law
where you make choices like that. And you hold to standards like that.
And, if people deviate from it, they deviate from it. But there are all sorts
of reasons to do that. But I would argue that that's going to be increasingly
difficult to do, as investor expectations change, as the actual investors with
multiple interests gain more power andmore influence.
So to sum up, you know, these are a number of different examples. And I
think my basic argument is that, if we look at the DNA of some of these
institutions that are growing, and onlygoing to get more powerful, we can
see that they have these multiple preferences built right into what they do,
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that there are more than one ways to answer interests through investment
than just maximizing returns.

[00:36:25]
And it's going to pose a challenge to regulation, to lawyers, to academics,
to judges, to try to figure out, you know, how do we shift our doctrines?
How far do we shift them? How much do we police them the way they are
in dealing with these various pressures, much in the way that we have had
to transition our law in the 20h century, from a world and dominated by
individual investors, to a world that, today, is clearly dominated by
institutional ones.
So with that, I think you guys are on the frontline. I would love to get your
questions, comments,thoughts, challenges, anything to anything that Ijust
said. Thank you.
[applause]

Q: Are you aware

of any [00:37:12] Board of Directors chose less [?] than
optimal business decision [00:37:19] pressure from the stockholder group?
And if they would get away with that?

[00:37:24]
DAVID WEBBER: So let me answer that. You're talking about a
corporate part? So the examples that I have at my fingertips are actually
sort of pension boards, and boards of trustees. So let me-Okay. So on the
trustee side, on the pension side, for example, a number of these pension
funds and other entities have adopted policies like, for example, the Ohio
Funds. They're not going to invest in any privatizing investments
whatsoever. They're just not going to do it. They're not going to fund it.
They're not going to do it.
Other entities, like CalPRS and CalSTRS have adopted these sort ofmaybe half measures isn'texactly quite the word, but there are certain kinds
of rules that they apply to invest, public, private partnerships, etcetera,
etcetera. Private equity funds, there are private equity policies, etcetera. So
many of these funds, for example, CalSTRS, in the gun company instance,
has now negotiated separate new agreements as part of their being a limited
partner in these private equityfunds, to enable them not to participate in
certain investments, etcetera.
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[00:38:40]
So I center this on the investment side, on the investor side, because I think
that's clearly where the pressure is coming from. In terms of on the
company side, you know, on the investee side, you know, I think that, first
of all, it's not the kind of thing-On the investor side, you can create a
policy. And you can say, "This is our policy, and this is what we're doing,"
right. I don't think anybody is going to come out and say that that's the
reason that they're doing it.
But I'll give you one example. A company is investing-boycotting Israel.
This is an example that's come up recently. There are a number of
companies that have said, right-One CEO of a company in Egypt
recently said that they were pulling out of the Israeli market for exactly
this kind of reason. That's an example of a company that is responding to
pressures like that. And, by the way, there are counter-boycotts now going
on, along very similar lines, right, where Governor Cuomo in New York,
and New York Pension Funds have now announced they're going to
boycott any companies that announce that they are boycotting-right,
okay.

[00:39:55]
So we're off to the races. I mean one-you know, one interesting project
that I'm hoping to work on is Israel's launching a sovereign wealth fund
next year. How are they going to-You know, what should they do about
companies that are boycotting them? Should I invest in them to try to
change that through their shareholder power? Or should they just counterboycott? Or should they just ignore that?
So it's out there. Yeah, I think it's out there. And, you know, we'll see what
happens, too, withpublic benefit corporations, and the extent to which you
can see, you know-I mean Delaware recently adopted this statute that's
going to-that explicitly allows for departures under public interest,
etcetera. Do I detect some skepticism on your part as to how influential
these powers will be?

Q:

Yeah, you sure do. [laughter] So you think it will just go on? It's hard
for me [00:41:00] the Board of Directors [00:41:02] specific investment
that was not in our company's best interest, because some group of
stockholders asked them to do that. And they expected all the other
stockholders to say, "Oh, that's perfectly okay." [00:41:18] The
stockholders approved it. That seems to be the trend recently. But,
nonetheless, I just can't believe that that [00:41:27]
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[00:41:28]
DAVID WEBBER: Well, I agree with you in that. I don't think it would
ever play out that way. It's very hard to see it playing out that way, right,
which is, we will, you know, we're goingto take investment decision X
because such and such shareholder wants us to. And we don't think it's in
the best interest of the-That's not going to happen, right.

[00:41:50]
If you go back to an article by Gilson and Milhaupt about sovereign wealth
funds a few years back, I don't think anybody is worried about this on that
level. But you know, some of the examples they talk through in that paper
include potential trade secret disclosure, or technology, or even-Look.
Look at the-How about, if a particular country's sovereign wealth fund
makesan investment in your company, okay. And you are the CEO. And
you have the choice of building that factory in China, or in Mexico, which
doesn't have a particularly big sovereign wealth fund, as far as I know.
It doesn't seem implausible to me that decisions like that, at the margins,
that these pressures at the margins begin to affect that kind of decisionmaking, right. I don't know if that requires a fullboard, right, to bring out
all the big guns. But at the margins, I think you start to see distortions like
that, or at least potential deviations from the traditional criteria.

Q: I think most everybody here understands pretty well how the [00:43:09]
gets enforced in traditional corporate board context, right. I know next to
nothing about how it gets enforced in the context of pension funds. And
your example of the pension fund that has both current employees and
retirees [00:43:29] interest on that privatization question, may have great
interest.In that kind of case, if the trustees to the pension fund decide to
pursue the non-wealth maximizing investment, or not to pursue the
privatization, do the retirees have a loyalty claim?
And if they do, what do they do about it?

[00:43:55]
DAVID WEBBER: So one of the fascinating aspects of having-you
know, coming from a securities and corporate background, and start to
look into the investor side, the first thing you notice is the complete lack
of litigation, almost total lack of litigation in that space. And for thoseof us
who come, particularly in securities, where you feel like you can't take two
steps without a regulation, a rule, you know, something-and never mind
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10 cases that are on point, that world, it's a deafening silence. There are
like-You can cover it all in four or five cases.

[00:44:32]
There have been a number of cases, so for four or five, that's still a number.
There were some very interesting cases in the '70s about this in New York
City, where the New York City Teacher Retirement Fund made a
substantial investment in New York City bonds, at a time when the city
was in deep trouble of potentially going bankrupt. And so the teacher fund
swoops in with a big investment, and they got sued, for saying, "You're
jeopardizing my nest egg with this investment." And ultimately, the
trustees were vindicated in that suit. And they were allowed to-and the
investment was allowed to proceed.

[00:45:19]
I'll tell you about a couple other cases that have come up along these lines.
One went to the 1 VhCircuit. I think it was in the late '80s. And what
happened is, the pension fund was making below-market rate loans,
housing loans to their own members. And the Department of Labor sued
them, saying, "You can't do that. You can't make a bllow-market rate loan
to your membersbecause that's not good for the fund. You're deviating
from value maximizing returns to the fund." And they came in with this
particular read of the Duty of Loyalty, precisely that read, that says, you've
got to-[00:45:59] return to the fund. And the 1 1tb Circuit ruled against
them and lost on that one. And basically looked at the process, what the
Circuit was focused on the processof the trustees undertook in making that
decision, and on and on and on.
And one other quick one, which was similar in San Diego, a weird set of
facts-I won't go too far into detail. But the bottom line was, is that the
trustees made a decision that hurt the fund but helped the jobs of their
employees. Basically, San Diego, there was a screw-up. And San Diego
had over-committed to its pension fund. And then basically came back to
the pension fund and said, "Ifyou don't"-I forget what the exact condition
was. But they came back to the pension fund, and basically threatened that,
"We're going to have to fire people unless you accept a lower contribution
from us." That's what it was. And the trustees agreed to it, and they got
sued by members for, "You know, you're hurting the fund."

[00:47:01]
So yes, they have a right to sue. They could bring a lawsuit. But it really
hasn't happened very much. Maybe in part because-I don't know why. I
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mean I wonder if-One thing I've been keeping an eye on is this recent
spate of 401(k) cases. These are pretty new. There are now a number of
lawsuits out there. This didn't happen a few years ago. Where law firms
are out there,bringing suits against fiduciaries of 401(k) plans, typically
for fees, excessive fees, tolerating excessive fees, things of that nature.
Sometimes you just need a bar that knows about this stuff, and goes out,
and starts bringing these kinds of cases. But you know, there's no question
that-I think people are paying more attention to this now. And I don't
know if we're going to see some lawsuits. And, by the way, one point I
just wanted to make clear about that Aramark example, I'm not suggesting
that it should be a per se breach of the duty of loyalty to make such an
investment in the first place, right.

[00:48:12]
The question, though, that's interesting is, you know, could it be part of
the prep[?], you know. Some would say, it would be a breach of the duty
of loyalty to even consider the impact on workers of this investment, to
even take it into account, right. And so I would argue, well maybe there's
a little more scope for doing something like that.
Q: This is PBGC is the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation

[00:48:43].
DAVID WEBBER: Not that I know of, on the fiduciary duty stuff. You
know, it's very interesting, the way this all works at the federal level,
because all sorts of different entities have authority. But actually, through
some kind of deal, really between the IRS and the Department of Labor,
going back a couple decades, the IRS defers to the Department of Labor.
So this is really, at the federal level, this is really in the bailiwick of the
U.S. Department of Labor. And it has been a back-and-forth.

[00:49:18]
So in '94, in the first Clinton term, they came out with an interpretive
bulletin that allowed pension trustees, for the first time, to take into
account-what's their phrase? It's effectively-It's not socially responsible
investments. It's economically targeted investments, which basically mean
that they can think about these other things, as long as they're not
sacrificing returns. So once you've sort of reached sort of the returns
threshold-Okay. Right. But we all see that, once you open that door,
okay, in 2008, under Bush, they issued interpretive bulletins saying, "No,
no, no, fund only." And in November of 2015, the Obama Department of
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Labor revoked the '08 Bush interpretation, and deferred back to the '94
interpretation.

[00:50:14]
And this is probably more detail than you wanted. But, to add another layer
of it, all of this is technically legally irrelevant to public pension funds,
which are state-created entities, okay. So this is another-This maybe also
ties into your point, Larry, which is like, there is so much legal uncertainty
that paradoxically, I think, it generates in a way less litigation rather than
more.
Because what happens is, the DOL's pronouncements don't have any
actual legal authority overthe pension funds. Nevertheless, it sort of, in the
culture of the lawyers who advise these entities, advise them essentially,
"Your best bet-You know, focus on returns to the fund." And that's what
they do, I think, or with some exceptions.
So you're in this very weird netherworld, where it's up to 50 state Attorneys
General, and 50 state legislatures. And I actually did the dreaded 50 state
survey on this a few years ago. And like20-some, 20-25 of them had
basically close to identical language to ERISA. And some others departed.
And some say, "We kind of follow ERISA, maybe." It's in the absence of
a lot of direct legal authority, you get this, I think, conservatism in the
sense of the legal advice they're getting. So in short, no, I don't think the

PBGC is done.

Q:

So you mentioned an example with the Teachers Pension Fund in
California divesting itself from, I think it was firearm manufacturers. But
that doesn't strike me as something where you would have unanimous
support from teachers, because they have varying opinions, in short.
Some of them are very passionate about weapons. Is there a threshold
amount, where the pension fund, for example, has to have-or at least
believe in a certain amount of support, where they're going to start
divesting? Or right now, is it just up in the air?

[00:52:17]
DAVID WEBBER: Yeah, that's fascinating. And I thought about that
myself, because you know, it's like, this goes back to the point I was
making at the end of the talk, about how, in some ways, I think what will
happen, or needs to happen, is these entities are going to start looking more
to corporate law and corporate forums, in terms of how they think and
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grapple with stuff like this. So at least in the corporate context, you have
some kind of a check-back with your shareholders in the form of annual
voting, director elections, say on pay, whatever it may be. You know, you
have some kind of feedback mechanism, a "How am I doing?" feedback
mechanism to your shareholders, right.

[00:52:57]
That's separate, you know. And maybe that's not exactly how we think
about fiduciary duty, typically. But it's there, right. And so I've wondered.
I mean you could imagine, you know, ratification of decisions like that, or
something along those lines. But [00:53:11] is like a matter of sort of law,
is there some kind of known threshold? I mean, do they have to know that
X number of their members approve? There's no such thing, that I'm aware
of. No such threshold.
What you do have, and where that stuff gets sussed out, is in the duty of
impartiality, where you can't favor one set of your beneficiaries over a
different set of your beneficiaries. But gosh, you really have to be-to run
afoul of that is hard, okay. I mean every investment decision is impartial.
If you make an investment decision that has a 10 year time horizon, okay,
that's goingto have differential effects for the people who just started
contributing to the pension fund, versus the folks who are retired, right.

[00:54:04]
So there's all-there's always a multiplicity of interests. And therefore,
impartiality is impossible to get to. But that strikes me as, you know, as an
unanswered question, as of right now. And maybe you could-If you were
a nervous trustee, what more might you do to insulate yourself? I think
these-I know, I've actually spoken to groups of trustees like this. They're
thinking about this stuff. I mean this comes up. And it just seems to me
right for litigation, even though it hasn'tquite played out that way.

Q: So this isn't really a question, but a comment from, I think, the only
person in the room who's not a corporate lawyer, but constitutional law
lawyer. As I'm listening to this last dialogue, it's fascinating to think about,
since this is all about political investments, the First Amendment decisions
that deal with other people's money. And so there's two interesting strains.
One is the Abood [?] strain, named after a famous case involving-and
has involved an analogue to a California [00:55:22] the Keller[?] case.
These were both Supreme Court cases, which deal with the extent to
which, if you're forced to pay dues of some kind, you have a right not to
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have the entity you're paying the dues to use it for ideological purposes
that you don't agree with.
So Keller involved the California State Bar. And the question is, could the
State Bar take positions on political ideological issues? Or could it only
use the money that the California lawyers were required to pay for sort of
non-controversial justice issues? You know, access to justice, and that sort
of thing. And the Abood involved the Teachers Union of Detroit with the
same sort of notion. You can force me to pay dues for teacher stuff. But
you can't necessarily use the dues to try to sustain Roe v. Wade or
something like that.
And then, of course, in the corporate world, there's Citizens United, in
which the Supreme Court essentially rejected the idea that there was some
First Amendment problem with taking other people's money and using it
for political [00:56:26] perspective. So there's a fascinating thing. Because
I was listening to you, in terms of this problem from a corporate law
perspective, listening to the extent there was any forced payment in any of
these contexts. Like you've got [00:56:40] through the pension fund, or
something like that. You could have some interesting First Amendment
challenges to, "I only gave you this to maximize my return. I didn't give
you this to take positions one way or the other on guns."

[00:56:57]
DAVID WEBBER: Well, you know, this Fredericks case, just as an
interesting follow-up on that, that Abood decision was squarely on the
chopping block earlier this year, in Fredericks. So Justice Alito had invited
an opinion and said, "Maybe it's time for us to reconsider Abood." And the
Fredericks case was that case. Nine California teachers, who had todidn't have to contribute to the union's political fund, but still had to pay a
fee to the union because of collective bargaining that the union did on its
behalf, challenged that fee on those grounds, on First Amendment
grounds. And it looked like it was going to five-four to strike down. And
then we-You know, and then after Justice Scalia passed, that wasAbood was upheld in the four to four vote.
[00:57:51]
So yeah, I mean I just-Talk about another point of convergence. These
issues are coming up ohthe investment side, more and more, for any
number of reasons. More disclosure, organizations that are dedicated to
thinking about this stuff. So I don't know. I think we'll be hearing more
about it in many contexts.
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[applause]
Thank you.
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